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Susan Bartlett Footet
In Regulation and Federalism,' C. Boyden Gray describes a theoretical
framework for distributing regulatory authority in a federalist state. In
this comment, I provide an alternative model that goes beyond Gray's
framework to establish specific criteria for allocating regulatory power be-
tween the states and the federal government.
I. Gray's Model
Gray's framework rests upon the two Reagan Administration initiatives
of regulatory relief and the New Federalism.' In support of these princi-
ples, Gray recommends a presumption in favor of state-level regulation.
This presumption may, however, be rebutted if, under any one of four
"rubrics" (burdens on interstate commerce, federal accommodation, inter-
state competition, or federal expertise), legitimate federal interests out-
weigh those of the states.8
This framework suffers from two significant limitations. First, it lacks
criteria for determining when the federal interest represented by one of
the four rubrics is sufficiently important to overcome the presumption in
favor of regulation at the state level. In the absence of specific criteria,
politics, rather than guiding principles, often determines when the pre-
sumption will be overcome. Second, the framework forces a stark choice
between exclusive state control or exclusive federal control through pre-
emption. Without a mechanism to accommodate competing federal and
state interests, pressure for federal exclusivity may seriously undercut the
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legitimate interests of the states-an unexpected result for a model based
upon the principles of the New Federalism.
To protect state interests, our lawmakers must move beyond politics
and develop principles to guide the allocation of regulatory authority. Re-
cently, many states have responded to the lack of federal regulatory
activity by increasing the number of state regulations.4 In response, advo-
cates of deregulation, who formerly were opposed to regulation at any
governmental level, have turned with increasing frequency to Washington
to ask for centralized regulations that preempt state laws.5 Thus, the pat-
tern of the 1970's, when protection-minded consumers sought safety under
the wing of federal agencies and deregulation advocates favored state au-
tonomy, has reversed. Amidst this swirl of shifting allegiances and politi-
cal pressures, there is a danger that important state interests will be over-
looked. This possibility creates the need for a searching reevaluation of
the politics and principles of federalism.
I propose an alternative model that goes beyond Gray's framework to
accommodate both federal and state interests in social regulation." After
providing a doctrinal basis for the model, I shall describe and apply it to a
recent regulatory controversy. This example illustrates the differences be-
tween Gray's proposed framework and my own.
II. Accommodating State & Federal Interests
The doctrine of independent state grounds, which is rooted in federal
and state constitutional law,' provides an excellent means for characteriz-
ing the relationship between federal and state governments in social regu-
lation. Under this doctrine, state constitutions may supplement and ex-
pand federally guaranteed constitutional rights, but cannot conflict with or
undermine them. In addition, any expansion of individual rights by state
constitutions cannot infringe upon other rights protected by the federal
Constitution. For example, a state-created First Amendment right to cir-
culate literature on private property is proper only when it does not im-
4. State Regulators Rush In Where Washington No Longer Treads: Will the New Federalism
Create A 50-Headed Hydra?, BUS. WK., Sept. 19, 1983, at 124.
5. Id. See also Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1983, at 7, col. 1 (chemical industry requesting uniform
federal regulation of chemical labeling).
6. While economic regulation governs prices, output, terms of competition, entry, and exit, social
regulation focuses on the impact on society of this economic activity. See Weidenbaum, The New
Wave of Government Regulation of Business, 15 BUS. & SOC'Y REV. 81, 81-82 (1975). The discus-
sion in this Comment is limited to social regulation because Gray's framework primarily applies to
issues in this area. The federal and state interests in economic regulation are also different from those
raised by social regulation. This model may, however, have more general applications to federalism
issues in other contexts.
7. For an extensive discussion of this doctrine, see Developments in the Law-The Interpretation
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
Vol. 1: 217, 1984
Federalism: An Alternative Model
pinge on property rights protected by the federal Constitution.' State con-
stitutional guarantees thus occupy the space between the federal floor of
minimum constitutional protection and the federal ceiling set by other
constitutionally protected interests.
Historically, protection of health and safety was the exclusive province
of the states; the federal government's role was to prevent state regulations
from burdening interstate commerce.' During the 1960's and early 1970's,
however, the federal government, through the creation of regulatory agen-
cies, enacted a broad range of national minimum health and safety stan-
dards.1" The federal government thus established both a federal floor and
ceiling, as if applying the doctrine of independent state grounds to social
regulation. This framework can be used as a model to allocate regulatory
authority between states and the federal government. The federal govern-
ment both sets national minimum standards and protects the Union
against state-imposed trade barriers, but the states retain residual powers
to regulate within these boundaries.
III. The Alternative Model
The purpose of the alternative model is to accommodate the legitimate
interests of both the states and the federal government. To do so it is
necessary to identify the boundaries of these interests with some precision.
These boundaries can be found by dividing regulation into five discrete
stages.
Stage 1: The Product. This stage involves regulation of the attributes of
the product, such as design and performance standards. Uniform national
product standards protect both the federal interest in safety and health
and the free flow of interstate commerce. Supplemental state regulations
governing product attributes generally impede the national market. For
example, if an individual state establishes product standards which are
more protective than those established at the federal level, manufacturers
8. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (State constitutional provisions
permitting individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on property of a privately owned
shopping center do not violate owner's property rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments or
free speech rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.)
9. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating
as undue burden on commerce a North Carolina statute that prohibited the display of Washington
State's apple grading system on containers entering North Carolina); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating as undue burden on commerce an Arizona order requiring a local
canteloupe producer to build and operate a packing plant rather than ship the fruit to California for
packing and inspection).
10. Examples include the Occupational Safety Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 and in scattered sections of 15, 25, 30, & 42 U.S.C.); the Toxic
Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2600-2629; and the Consumer Product Safety Act of
1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 and 5 U.S.C. §§ 5314-5315.
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will either impose those higher standards on other unwilling states or
forego the market in the more protective state. In essence, regulations
adopted by individual states are inappropriate when they impose costs on
manufacturers by interfering with economies of scale that would otherwise
be available in the production of nationally distributed goods." In Stage
1, therefore, the federal interest in the national market generally out-
weighs the states' interest in establishing stricter health and safety stan-
dards, and justifies preemption of supplemental state requirements.
Stage 2: Production. Regulation at this stage addresses both the impact
of production on nationwide health and environmental standards and site-
specific workplace and community issues. For example, pollution from
one source may affect the air or water quality in many states, but work-
related exposure to toxic chemicals will only affect workers at an individ-
ual plant. Economies of scale in decisionmaking,"' the tragedy of the com-
mons,' 3 and interstate competition' 4 all suggest a federal role in regulating
production. As Gray's rubrics recognize, centralized decisionmaking is a
desirable response to these problems. However, federal involvement
should not preempt all state-imposed regulation of production because
more restrictive state laws may not always undermine the federal safety
floor or burden interstate commerce. Where the health or environmental
effects of additional state production regulations are purely in-state, fed-
eral preemption is not justified.
Stage 3: Process of Exchange. Regulation of the process of exchange
involves requirements for information to accompany the product, such as
labeling, patient package inserts, or instructional brochures. For some in-
formation requirements, federal uniformity may be justified to protect the
11. This problem was clearly a concern when Congress granted California a waiver from the
preemption sections of the Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (1976 & Supp. V 1981),
permitting that state to enact more stringent auto emissions standards on new vehicles. See Hearings
on Problems and Progress Associated with the Control of Automobile Exhaust Emissions (Automotive
Air Pollution, Part 1) before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 107, 403 (1967).
12. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementa-
tion of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210 (1977) (economies of scale occur
when technically complex issues are decided more cheaply once at the national level than repeatedly at
the state and local level); Gray, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that where regulatory efforts require
"highly specialized scientific and technical expertise" it is most efficient for the "federal government to
take the lead in developing standards").
13. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 1211 (the "tragedy of the commons" arises when the self-
interest of rational but independent decisionmakers leads to results that leave all decisionmakers worse
off than they would have been if collective agreement had been possible); Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 83 SCIENCE 1234 (1968).
14. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 1212 (interstate competition to attract new industry may lead to
state regulation at the lowest common denominator, such as weak environmental standards); Gray,
supra note 1, at 106 (arguing that states may seek to attract "industry, funds or population by creat-
ing regulatory programs that are more lenient than those of other states" and that federal regulation
may be necessary to prevent the "undesirable effects of this competition").
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national flow of commerce. This argument for preemption will not, how-
ever, be determinative in all cases. For example, state information re-
quirements that do not affect the product package will not burden the
national market because such regulations do not limit manufacturers'
economies of scale in packaging products for distribution in the national
market. Therefore, while federal intervention in the process of exchange
may be justified, federal preemption of all state requirements is not.
Stage 4: Conditions of Sale or Services. Regulation at this stage involves
requirements for the sale of products or provision of services imposed at
the point of sale. In virtually every case, these requirements have an ex-
clusive in-state impact and consequently do not burden the national mar-
ket. Therefore, if these state-mandated conditions do not undermine fed-
eral safety standards, preemption is unjustified."5 Licensing requirements
for health care professionals or other service providers, for example, are
generally the prerogative of states. 6 Similarly, additional state-imposed
restrictions on alcohol, fireworks, and other dangerous products sold
within their borders should not be preempted.
Stage 5: Conditions of Use. Regulation at this stage encompasses re-
quirements imposed on the use of products or services. These regulations,
like those imposed at Stage 4, generally have an exclusive in-state impact,
and should not be preempted unless they undermine the federal safety
floor. For example, state requirements establishing preconditions for the
use of dangerous products, such as mandatory safety training, have no
interstate commerce effect and thus should not be preempted arbitrarily.
IV. Application of the Alternative Model: Chemical Labeling
An examination of the federal chemical labeling decision,17 a recent ex-
ample of social regulation, illustrates how the alternative model works to
accommodate both state and federal interests.
In response to concerns over the hazards posed by chemicals in the
workplace, many states, and municipalities adopted varying regulations
15. Preemption may be justified, however, where state rules conflict with other federal rights,
such as the first amendment. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that,
although states have a legitimate interest in regulating time, place and manner of lawyer advertising,
they may not unreasonably restrict the first amendment rights of lawyers to disseminate, and the right
of the public to receive, information on cost and availability of legal services).
16. See Ruben, The Legal Web of Professional Regulation, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 29,
35-36 (1980) (State licensing of professions is "so ingrained . . . that it has become synonomous with
professionalization in the United States.") Recently, the federal government has begun to assert some
control over the professions, primarily though the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Justice Department, Id. at 39, but comprehensive federal preemption of state licensing
requirements is "remote." Id. at 47. The theory developed in this Comment indicates that such federal
regulation is inappropriate.
17. Hazard Communication, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983).
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addressing this problem.' As a consequence, the Occupational Health
and Safety Administration (OSHA) promulgated a national standard last
year.' The purpose of OSHA's rule, which the chemical industry
strongly supported,2 was to establish mandatory uniform standards for
both manufacturers and employers,"' thereby preempting more stringent
state requirements. 2 To achieve this goal, OSHA will scrutinize all state
and local chemical labeling requirements to gauge their conformity with
the federal standard."8 Legal challenges to the rule were filed as soon as it
was issued,"' and undoubtedly the Supreme Court will eventually deter-
mine the scope of OSHA's preemptive authority. The significant policy
question the rule raises, however, is whether federal preemption of all
existing or future state chemical labeling laws undermines important state
interests which do not infringe on legitimate federal interests.
Gray supports federal uniformity under the OSHA rule, arguing that
the presumption in favor of state regulation should be rebutted "to dis-
courage the adoption of burdensome and inconsistent local laws."' 8 Gray's
model, however, lacks criteria for determining what constitutes a "burden-
some" state law that would justify federal preemption. Arguably, several
state requirements are always more "burdensome" than a single federal
standard. Does this mean states should acquiesce whenever their laws are
more stringent than federal requirements? Without some mechanism to
accommodate both federal and state interests, OSHA's uniform federal
standard may undermine the sovereign role of the states in protecting the
safety and health of their workers, and state officials may soon find them-
selves battling to prevent preemption of their more protective statutes."
In contrast, the alternative model provides the necessary mechanism, for
18. The states of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York,
and Washington, and the City of Philadelphia have all enacted statutes in the hazardous chemicals
area. Hazard Communication, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,092, 12,095, 12,100 (1982). Furthermore, at the time
the OSHA rule was proposed, New Jersey, Ohio, Wisconsin and such cities as Louisville, Ky., and
Santa Ana, Cal., were in various stages of enacting similar legislation. Id.
19. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280. This rule was adopted after the publication of Gray's article. Though
substantially similar to the proposed rule discussed by Gray, OSHA's stated position on the preemp-
tive effect of its rule was significantly stronger in the final rule.
20. See An OSHA Rule Industry Wants Despite the Cost, BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 1983, at 47.
21. Hazard Communication, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,343 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1900.1200
(fm1)-(9)) (((1) and (2) apply to manufacturers, (f)(4)-(8) apply to employers, and (f)(3) and (9)
apply to both).
22. Id. at 53,322 (Hazard Communication rule "preempts competing state standards which (1o not
meet certain procedural and substantive criteria").
23. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2) (1982) (allows states to petition for approval of regulations
"at least as effective" as the federal OSHA regulations).
24. See Public Citizen v. Auchter, No. 83-3565 (3d Cir. filed Nov. 25, 1983) (filed by a coalition
of public interest, health, and labor groups the day the final rule was issued).
25. Gray, supra note 1, at 103.
26. Such battles will occur under the authority of the OSHA Act, which established a procedure
allowing states to apply for exemption from preemption. See supra note 21.
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protecting important state interests. An examination of federal regulations,
using the decisionmaking criteria of each regulatory stage, highlights the
affected state interests and determines the appropriateness of federal
action.
The final OSHA rule addresses workplace hazards by mandating
labeling,"' the availability of safety data sheets,2" and employee informa-
tion and training.29 These requirements encompass several stages on the
regulatory spectrum.
The OSHA labeling standards fall into two categories: some apply to
manufacturers and others to employers."0 The labeling requirements ap-
plying to manufacturers are Stage 3 regulations governing the "process of
exchange." To protect the national market, these Stage 3 regulations justi-
fiably may be preempted. This preemption results because a variety of
state labeling rules mandating that specific language be affixed to contain-
ers prior to shipping will increase manufacturers' costs (and decrease the
scale economies) in distributing products nationally. In contrast, the label-
ing requirements for employers-involving in-plant signs on stationary
containers" or pipes-are site-specific and do not burden the national
market. State requirements imposed on plants within state borders are
Stage 2 regulations protecting employee safety in the workplace, rather
than Stage 3 regulations imposed at the point of manufacture. The purely
in-state impact of such Stage 2 safety requirements renders federal pre-
emption inappropriate. In sum, although OSHA officials assumed broad
preemptive authority over both manufacturer and employer labeling regu-
lations, these regulations have very different effects on state and federal
interests and should be considered separately.
The OSHA rule requires manufacturers to provide the purchasers of
hazardous chemicals with material safety data sheets, 2 which contain in-
formation about the safe handling and use of hazardous chemicals. 33 The
rule sets standards for the sheets 4 and preempts more extensive state re-
quirements.3 " This portion of the OSHA rule affects the process of ex-
change, a Stage 3 regulation. Although these data sheets may travel with
the product in interstate commerce, a broad federal preemption of all such
27. Hazard Communication, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,343 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200
(0(1)49)).
28. Id. at 53,343 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (g)(1)-(10)).
29. Id. at 53,344 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (h)(1)-(2)).
30. See supra note 21.
31. Hazard Communication, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,343 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1900.1200
(0(5)).
32. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1900.1200 (g)(1)).
33. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 19 00.1200(g)(1)-(10)).
34. Id.
35. See supra note 22.
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state laws is inappropriate. Federal preemption is only appropriate where
states require data sheets to be an integral part of the product package
(and thereby burden the national market) or set standards that are below
the federal minimum. The state data sheet requirements may increase the
cost of doing business in individual states, but these increased costs do not
affect the scale economies in production and packaging available to manu-
facturers. Manufacturers also can easily allocate these increased costs to
products sold in the states imposing them. Moreover, the states' interest in
safety provides a sufficient basis for leaving the calculation of purely local
cost/safety tradeoffs to state legislatures.
Finally, the OSHA rule established employee training and information
standards," and provided authority for preempting divergent state re-
quirements."1 These standards are Stage 5 "conditions on use," and have
a solely in-state impact. Where these rules do not conflict with minimum
federal standards, states should be permitted to require additional em-
ployee safety training and education. Therefore, this broad grant of fed-
eral preemptive authority, at the expense of state interests in worker
health and safety, is inappropriate.
To summarize, some, but not all, aspects of the new OSHA rule justify
national uniformity. The specific impacts of the regulations must be eval-
uated to determine the state and federal interests involved, and conse-
quently the appropriate allocation of regulatory authority among the com-
peting levels of government.
Conclusion
Chemical labeling offers one example of the federal government's fail-
ure to recognize the important federalism issues raised by social regula,-
tion. This is not an isolated incident of federal overreaching, however.
The Food and Drug Administration," the Federal Trade Commission, 9
and the Department of Energy40 all have recently flexed their preemptive
muscles. In addition, the shifting political alignments surrounding federal-
ism disputes presage a rising number of clashes. Clearly, policymakers in
all branches of the federal government soon will have to grapple with
36. See supra note 29.
37. See supra note 22.
38. 47 Fed. Reg. 50,442 (1982) (to be codified in scattered sections of 21 C.F.R. pts. 211, 314 and
700) (FDA preempted further state packaging requirements but excluded certain products).
39. Katherine Gibbs School v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 667 (2d Cir. 1979) (FTC's proprietary, voca-
tional, and home study school rule was set aside in part because the FTC exceeded its power by
declaring a blanket preemption of any state rule that frustrated the purpose of the FTC rule).
40. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,376 (1983) (to be
codified at 10 C.F.R. § 430.32) (Department of Energy refused to issue energy-efficiency standards
for some appliances and asserted that these "no-standard" standards preempted state regulations).
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difficult federalism questions. The challenge is to develop principled re-
sponses that can override shifting political pressures.
The narrow political goals of interest groups always will, and indeed
should, influence democratic decisionmaking. Political pressure, regardless
of the principles of federalism, is an inevitable part of the process.
However, the politics of federalism pose considerable risks to the delicate
intergovernmental balance. Just as Washington-directed deregulation may
compromise federal interests in national minimum standards and a na-
tional market, unnecessary uniformity through federal preemption risks
centralization at the expense of legitimate state concerns.
The alternative model presented here reconciles the important federal
and state interests ih regulation. While the politics of federalism will al-
ways be played, our lawmakers must not allow politics to override the
nation's commitment to the greater and more enduring principles of
federalism.
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